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ABSTRACT 
  State courts are in financial crisis. Since the mid-1990s, state 
legislatures have allowed funding for their judicial systems to stagnate 
or dwindle. With diminished resources, state courts have struggled to 
provide adequate access to justice and dispute resolution. The solution 
to this crisis may lie in the doctrine of inherent judicial power. Courts 
have historically used inherent power to request additional funds 
from local legislative bodies for discrete expenditures. The use of 
inherent power to challenge the overall sufficiency of a judicial 
budget, however, has proven troubling. Under the current 
formulation of the inherent-power doctrine, a state court contesting 
the adequacy of a statewide judicial budget runs into two problems. 
First, by invoking its inherent power to compel additional funding, the 
court may usurp the appropriation power of the legislature. Second, 
state courts threaten their own legitimacy by taking a portion of the 
state budget out of the political process. 
  In response to these problems, this Note proposes a reformulation 
of the inherent-power doctrine. Specifically, state courts should 
invoke inherent power against a legislature only under a standard of 
absolute necessity to perform the duties required by federal and state 
constitutional law. This new standard limits the use of inherent power 
to situations that threaten the judiciary’s ability to perform its 
constitutionally mandated functions. By cabining the permitted uses 
of inherent power, the standard respects the separation of powers and 
preserves the judiciary’s public legitimacy. 
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INTRODUCTION 
On June 29, 2011, Chief Justice Sue Bell Cobb resigned from the 
Alabama Supreme Court, four-and-a-half years into her six-year 
term.1 Among the reasons she offered for leaving office was the 
Alabama Legislature’s “alarming reduction in funding” for the state’s 
court system.2 She noted that over the past ten years the legislature 
forced the court system to spend $66.3 million to meet new statutory 
demands while providing less than one third of that amount in 
additional funds.3 Cobb’s resignation was not the first time that she 
had publicly bemoaned the legislature’s failure to fund the courts 
adequately. In April of that year she predicted “delays across the 
spectrum” after she drastically reduced the amount of time during 
which the state would conduct jury trials, closed all courthouses in the 
state to the public on Fridays, and fired hundreds of court employees.4 
After learning in May of a proposed budget that would cut an 
additional 8 percent from the judicial system, Cobb held a press 
conference asking voters to hold the legislature accountable for the 
cuts, contending that the “trial courts [could not] operate” on the 
reduced funds.5 She also mentioned that the supreme court was 
considering suing the legislature to prevent the new round of budget 
reductions.6 “That certainly would not be my preference,” Cobb said 
of a potential lawsuit, “[but] we’re not ruling that out.”7 
The financial condition of Alabama’s judicial system is not 
unique. Since the mid-1990s, even during times of economic 
prosperity, state legislatures around the country have allowed funding 
for their judicial systems to stagnate or dwindle.8 The recession that 
 
 1. Press Release, Ala. Supreme Court, Statement of Chief Justice Sue Bell Cobb 1 (June 
29, 2011), http://www.alacourt.gov/PR/Press%20Release%20ChiefJusticeCobbtoResign.pdf. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Bob Lowry, Court Offices Set To Close Fridays, HUNTSVILLE TIMES (Ala.), Apr. 13, 
2011, at A3. 
 5. Dana Beyerle, Alabama Chief Justice Says Lawsuit Possible over Court Funding, 
TUSCALOOSA NEWS (May 18, 2011, 3:30 AM), http://www.tuscaloosanews.com/article/20110518/ 
news/110519718. 
 6. Chief Justice Cobb also noted that the Alabama Supreme Court must uninamously 
make any decision to sue the legislature for additional funding. Alabama Chief Justice Warns of 
Potential Court Fight; Legislature’s Funding Plan Too Little for Courts, AL.COM, (May 17, 2011, 
12:40 PM), http://blog.al.com/wire/2011/05/alabama_chief_ justice_warns_of.html. 
 7. Beyerle, supra note 5. 
 8. ABA TASKFORCE ON PRESERVATION OF THE JUSTICE SYS., CRISIS IN THE COURTS: 
DEFINING THE PROBLEM, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES, RESOLUTION, at 2 (2011), 
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began in 2007, however, threatened to cause unprecedented damage 
to state court systems. As state revenues fell, legislatures looked to 
courts for additional savings. From 2008 to 2011, legislatures in most 
states cut judiciary spending by 10 to 15 percent.9 The result was a 
dramatic reduction in court services. Including Alabama, at least 
fourteen states have reduced the hours and days that their courts are 
open to the public.10 Litigants and defendants face lengthy delays 
before appearing on a court docket. Criminal cases in some states 
may take more than a year to clear,11 and civil cases fare much worse.12 
State courts, which handle 95 percent of all litigation in the United 
States,13 are struggling to provide the critical adjudicatory services 
that make up an effective justice system. As the chief justice of the 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court put it, state courts are at “the 
tipping point of dysfunction.”14 
The gravity of the state-court funding crisis calls for an 
appropriately strong solution. The nation relies on courts, especially 
state courts, to safeguard rights, support an efficient economy, and 
provide a buffer from overreach by the political branches.15 These 
political branches, often viewing the judiciary as “merely another 
government program” rather than a coequal branch of government,16 
have allowed court funding to wither to levels that threaten the 
judiciary’s ability to perform its constitutionally mandated duties. 
Had Chief Justice Cobb convinced the Alabama Supreme Court 
to move forward with a suit against the Alabama Legislature, she 
would have pursued a particularly intriguing legal option: invoking 
the court’s inherent power. Inherent powers are those not specifically 
enumerated in the governing constitution, but which each branch of 




 9. Id. at 2. 
 10. Id. at 5. 
 11. Id. at 3–4. 
 12. Id. at 3. 
 13. Richard Y. Schauffler & Matthew Kleiman, State Courts and the Budget Crisis: 
Rethinking Court Services, in 42 THE BOOK OF THE STATES 2010, at 289, 289 (Council of State 
Govt’s eds., 2010). 
 14. Margaret H. Marshall, Chief Justice, Supreme Judicial Court of Mass., Benjamin N. 
Cardozo Lecture: At the Tipping Point: State Courts and the Balance of Power 6 (Nov. 10, 
2009), available at http://www.abcny.org/pdf/Cardozo_post_final.pdf. 
 15. See infra text accompanying notes 65–67. 
 16. Maron v. Silver, 925 N.E.2d 899, 915 (N.Y. 2010). 
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duties.17 State courts have claimed certain inherent powers for most of 
their existence, generally to accomplish internal housekeeping tasks 
and to enforce judgments.18 In the midtwentieth century, courts began 
using the doctrine of inherent power to compel additional funding 
from legislative bodies. In most cases the funds were relatively 
insignificant and for discrete expenditures. In a few instances, 
however, courts used their inherent power for a broader purpose—to 
challenge the overall sufficiency of a judicial budget.19 Rather than 
demand payment for a particular budget item, these courts invoked 
their inherent power to demand greater general judicial 
appropriations. 
This Note evaluates this latter form of inherent power. Because 
of the rise of consolidated judicial systems—in which a central 
authority allocates funding for the entire state court system—modern 
disputes over the sufficiency of court budgets will likely take place at 
the state level, rather than within cities or counties.20 These disputes 
pit a legislature, which passes a meager judicial budget, against the 
state supreme court, which deems the budget insufficient to fulfill its 
constitutionally mandated duties. Courts that find themselves in this 
situation may wish to take Chief Justice Cobb’s suggestion and sue 
their legislature, hoping to invoke the judiciary’s inherent power to 
compel additional, adequate funding. 
Though this maneuver may sound attractive, scholars have 
harshly criticized the doctrine of inherent power when used by a state 
supreme court to compel funds from a coequal legislature.21 These 
critics have raised two principal objections. First, when a supreme 
court orders additional judicial funding, it usurps the appropriation 
power vested in the legislature. Second, an inherent-power order of 
this type moves a portion of the state budget outside the political 
arena. In bypassing the political process, courts threaten their public 
support and popular legitimacy. These two problems, scholars have 
 
 17. See Jeffrey Jackson, Judicial Independence, Adequate Court Funding, and Inherent 
Judicial Powers, 52 MD. L. REV. 217, 223–27 (1993) (“[T]he powers of each branch of 
government are not exhaustively listed in state constitutions.”). 
 18. See infra Part II.A. 
 19. See infra Part II.A. This Note discusses two such instances: Commonwealth ex rel. 
Carroll v. Tate, 274 A.2d 193, 199 (Pa. 1971), and the New York dispute between Chief Judge 
Sol Wachtler and Governor Mario Cuomo. 
 20. See infra text accompanying notes 117–124. 
 21. See infra Part II.B. 
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concluded, make inherent power inappropriate in a state-level 
funding dispute. 
This Note seeks to counter this conclusion. Inherent power can 
and should be a potential weapon in the fight against diminishing 
judicial funding. But to prove useful in the state-court funding crisis, 
the inherent-power doctrine needs modification. To that end, this 
Note proposes a new standard for courts seeking to compel additional 
judicial funding from a legislature: absolute necessity to perform the 
duties required by federal and state constitutional law. This 
formulation, call it constitutional absolute necessity, improves on past 
standards by limiting the potential disputes that would sanction the 
use of inherent power and by grounding the use of inherent power in 
the judicial branch’s constitutional duties. These two limitations 
safeguard courts’ legitimacy and lessen the chance that courts will 
usurp the legislature’s appropriation power. 
Constitutional absolute necessity builds on articulations of 
inherent power provided by two state supreme court cases from the 
1990s, Hosford v. State22 and Folsom v. Wynn.23 These two cases 
approached inherent judicial power from different angles. Hosford 
viewed the invocation of inherent power as a distasteful enterprise, 
yet one that courts must entertain—on limited occasions—to 
maintain their integrity.24 To cabin the power effectively, the court in 
Hosford demanded that courts find additional funding to be 
“absolutely necessary” before issuing a funding order against a 
legislative body.25 By contrast, Wynn imagined a viable use of 
inherent power to challenge the overall sufficiency of a state budget.26 
To the Wynn court, the judicial branch has the obligation to protect 
itself against debilitating encroachments of legislative defunding.27 
Wynn does, however, provide a definite limit to inherent power’s use. 
Courts employing the doctrine of inherent power must identify a 
 
 22. Hosford v. State, 525 So. 2d 789 (Miss. 1988). 
 23. Folsom v. Wynn, 631 So. 2d 890 (Ala. 1993) (per curiam). 
 24. Hosford, 525 So. 2d at 797–98. 
 25. Id. at 798. 
 26. See Wynn, 631 So. 2d at 900 (“At a constitutional minimum . . . the Judicial Branch of 
government must be funded sufficiently to fulfill the duties required of it by the Constitution.”). 
 27. See id. at 899 (“If the judicial system is to be a truly co-equal and independent branch 
answerable only to the sovereign—the people—[then] it must have the power to maintain itself 
under exigent circumstances.” (quoting Morgan Cnty. Comm’n v. Powell, 293 So. 2d 830, 847 
(Ala. 1974) (Heflin, C.J., dissenting))). 
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specific constitutional deficiency produced by meager judicial-system 
funding.28 
Neither case alone describes inherent power in a manner that 
both limits the potential for judges to abuse the doctrine and retains 
the doctrine’s viability in the context of a state-level budget dispute. 
Hosford did not imagine inherent judicial power outside of the 
county-court setting, and its absolute-necessity standard—without 
more—does not remove the doctrine from the realm of a judge’s self-
interest.29 Wynn continued to rely on a threshold for judicial action 
that has proven insufficient to meet the tasks of modern judicial 
budgeting, namely, the reasonable-necessity standard.30 Merging the 
insights of both cases, however, produces a synergistic result. An 
inherent-power doctrine that reserves the power only for absolutely 
necessary situations and requires a specific constitutional violation 
will provide judicial systems a useful legal avenue for protecting the 
critical services that courts provide. 
This Note proceeds in three parts. Part I describes the state-court 
funding crisis. Part II recounts the history of inherent power in state 
courts—from the early days of courts’ internal housekeeping to the 
highly publicized dispute between Governor Mario Cuomo and Chief 
Judge Sol Wachtler of New York in 1991—and then describes how 
scholars have criticized the use of inherent power in a funding dispute 
between a legislature and a state supreme court. Part III responds to 
the current shortcomings of the inherent-power doctrine by 
proposing, analyzing, and applying a new standard: absolute necessity 
to perform the duties required by federal and state constitutional law. 
I.  THE STATE-COURT FUNDING CRISIS 
Inadequate funding has brought many state court systems to a 
place of crisis, or as one state chief justice put it, “the edge of an 
abyss.”31 This Part will provide some facts about the state-court 
 
 28. Id. at 896–99; see also infra text accompanying notes 198–218. 
 29. See infra Part III.A–B. 
 30. For a discussion of the history of this standard, see infra Part II.A. For a discussion of 
the problems with this standard, see infra Part II.B. 
 31. Carol Hunstein, Chief Justice, Supreme Court of Ga., 2010 State of the Judiciary 
Address 5 (Mar. 16, 2010); see also Jim Galloway, Georgia Chief Justice: Court Systems on 
“Edge of an Abyss,” ATLANTA J.-CONST. BLOG (Mar. 16, 2010, 11:57 AM), http://
blogs.ajc.com/political-insider-jim-galloway/2010/03/16/georgia-chief-justice-court-systems-on-
edge-of-an-abyss (describing the Chief Justice’s address as “focus[ing] solely and squarely on 
the ever-shrinking 1 percent of the state budget that the court system runs on”). 
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budget crisis and briefly address their implications. Since the 
beginning of the economic downturn in late 2007, legislatures have 
increasingly cut judiciary funding in an effort to shore up state 
finances. From 2008 to 2011, courts in most states saw their budgets 
reduced by 10 to 15 percent.32 Thirty-two states saw reductions in 
2010,33 and forty-two faced cuts in 2011.34 The cuts show no sign of 
abating.35 In early 2011, the New York State Assembly eliminated 
$170 million, about 8.5 percent, of the state judiciary’s funds.36 The 
budget for California’s court system was $350 million smaller for 
fiscal year 2012 than it was in fiscal year 2011, representing an 8.6 
percent reduction in trial-court funding and a 9.7 percent cut in 
appellate-court funds.37 Other states share similar stories, seeing 
significant percentages of their court budgets cut from year to year.38 
These cuts occur even though they are unlikely to have a significant 
impact on the financial health of a state: court systems consume only 
1 to 2 percent of state spending.39 
Court business requires very little capital expenditure: almost all 
court spending goes to personnel.40 Consequently, from 2010 to 2011, 
fourteen states laid off employees, sixteen furloughed clerical staff 
 
 32. ABA TASKFORCE ON PRESERVATION OF THE JUSTICE SYS., supra note 8, at 2. 
 33. Adam Skaggs & Maria da Silva, Op-Ed., The Cost of Justice: Severe Budget Cuts Are 
Threatening Americans’ Access to the Courts, L.A. TIMES, July 8, 2011, at A13. 
 34. Wm. T. (Bill) Robinson III, Access to Courts a Fight Worth Fighting, 22 N.C. LAW., 
Feb. 2012, at 7, 7. 
 35. One might argue that the facts presented in this Part represent a temporary 
abandonment of state courts caused by the 2007 recession. Yet trends counsel otherwise. 
Legislatures have regularly cut judicial budgets in varying economic conditions since the mid-
1990s. ABA TASKFORCE ON PRESERVATION OF THE JUSTICE SYS., supra note 8, at 2. Plus, the 
factors that led to state-budget shortfalls during the recession still exist. Housing markets in 
many areas have yet to recover, a situation that limits statewide revenues. PHIL OLIFF, CHRIS 
MAI & VINCENT PALACIOS, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, STATES CONTINUE TO 
FEEL RECESSION’S IMPACT 4 (2012), http://www.cbpp.org/files/2-8-08sfp.pdf. Demographic 
changes over the next fifteen years will also negatively impact tax receipts. Schauffler & 
Kleiman, supra note 13, at 289. Of course, legislatures could raise taxes to increase overall 
revenue, which would reduce the severity of their conflicts with judicial branches. But that is a 
whole other conversation. 
 36. William Glaberson, Cuts Could Stall Sluggish Courts at Every Turn, N.Y. TIMES, May 
16, 2011, at A1. 
 37. Maura Dolan, Judges Dissent on State Cuts, L.A. TIMES, July 23, 2011, at AA1. Court 
officials in California predict at least a 15 percent cut in 2013’s budget. Id. 
 38. Georgia, Maine, Nevada, Oklahoma, and Oregon saw reductions of 10 percent or more 
in 2011. Glaberson, supra note 36. North Carolina’s judiciary lost 20 percent of its funding from 
2009 to 2012. Martin H. Brinkley, The President’s Perspective, 22 N.C. LAW., Feb. 2012, at 5, 6. 
 39. ABA TASKFORCE ON PRESERVATION OF THE JUSTICE SYS., supra note 8, at 1. 
 40. Id. at 4. 
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(thus reducing their pay), and nine furloughed judges.41 Some of these 
personnel reductions represent large portions of the courts’ 
workforces. Iowa lost 9.3 percent of its court staff in 2010.42 The 
Alabama judicial system fired over 20 percent of its employees in 
2010 and 2011.43 San Francisco County, California, laid off 40 percent 
of its staff in 2011.44 
As legislatures slashed judicial budgets, the services demanded of 
state courts increased. In 2008, state courts throughout the country 
received 106 million new cases, the most recorded up to that point,45 
and a 12 percent increase in case volume over ten years.46 Civil cases 
have been the greatest driver of the increase, ballooning by 29 
percent over that time period.47 Between 2007 and 2008 alone, the 
number of civil filings rose 7 percent.48 Some states have seen 
dramatically larger increases than the nation as a whole. For example, 
Georgia’s court filings grew almost 43 percent from 2000 to 2008.49 
New York’s rose 30 percent between 1999 and 2011.50 Florida saw its 
caseload balloon 64 percent from 1996 to 2006.51 All three of these 
 
 41. Id. at 5. 
 42. IOWA JUDICIAL BRANCH, JUSTICE IN THE BALANCE: THE IMPACT OF BUDGET CUTS 
ON JUSTICE 11–12 (2010), available at http://www.iowacourts.gov/wfData/files/StateofJudiciary/
JusticeInTheBalanceJan2010.pdf. 
 43. See Lowry, supra note 4 (reporting that the court system laid off 120 people in 2010 and 
150 in 2011, out of a workforce of about 2500); Eric Velasco, A Month’s Notice for 1/3 of Court 
Employees, BIRMINGHAM NEWS, Aug. 1, 2011, at A1 (noting the elimination of an additional 
255 workers on October 1, 2011). 
 44. Maura Dolan & Victoria Kim, Budget Cuts To Worsen Court Delays, L.A. TIMES, July 
20, 2011, at A1. 
 45. ROBERT C. LAFOUNTAIN ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, EXAMINING THE 
WORK OF STATE COURTS: AN ANALYSIS OF 2008 STATE COURT CASELOADS 19 (2010), 
available at http://www.courtstatistics.org/Other-Pages/~/media/Microsites/Files/CSP/EWSC-
2008-Online.ashx. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. WASH. ECON. GRP., THE ECONOMIC IMPACTS ON THE GEORGIA ECONOMY OF 
DELAYS IN GEORGIA’S STATE COURTS DUE TO RECENT REDUCTIONS IN FUNDING FOR THE 
JUDICIAL SYSTEM 6 (2011). 
 50. The Judicial System: The Feeblest Branch, ECONOMIST, Oct. 1, 2011, at 31. 
 51. See WASH. ECON. GRP., THE ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF DELAYS IN CIVIL TRIALS IN 
FLORIDA’S STATE COURTS DUE TO UNDER-FUNDING 3 (2009), available at 
http://www.floridabar.org/TFB/TFBResources.nsf/Attachments/1C1C563F8CAFFC2C8525753
E005573FF/$FILE/WashingtonGroup.pdf (reporting that the number of cases filed increased 
from 2.5 million per year to 4.1 million per year over that period). 
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states have faced severe judicial-budget cuts.52 As the amount of work 
has risen, courts are struggling to keep up. Most states cannot clear 
matters as fast as they receive them,53 meaning that the nation’s courts 
are accruing a growing backlog of open cases.54 
Staffing reductions and increased demand have led to significant 
delays in court proceedings. With fewer trial hours and less staff, 
cases of all kinds face long waits to come before a judge. But because 
constitutional protections for defendants force states to prioritize 
criminal trials,55 the long delays caused by reduced funds primarily 
affect civil cases. California’s experience illustrates the impact. In San 
Francisco County, cuts led the presiding judge to estimate that a 
newly filed lawsuit will take five years to go to trial, and an 
uncontested divorce will take at least a year.56 In San Diego County, a 
child custody evaluation takes up to sixteen weeks, up from about 
four.57 Even contesting a traffic citation, a relatively routine 
procedure, may take nine months.58 The presiding judge of Los 
Angeles County Superior Court commented that the lack of staff in 
California courts will “[leave] litigants with no expectation of relief or 
resolution of their cases for extended periods of time.”59 California is 
by no means alone in reducing access to civil proceedings. New 
Hampshire postponed jury trials for eighteen to twenty-four months.60 
One judicial circuit in Georgia simply suspended every civil trial.61 
 
 52. See id. at 4–5 (documenting budget cuts in Florida); WASH. ECON. GRP., supra note 49, 
at 3 (documenting budget cuts in Georgia); Glaberson, supra note 36 (documenting budget cuts 
in New York). 
 53. See LAFOUNTAIN ET AL., supra note 45, at 29 (“Of the 28 unified and general 
jurisdiction courts . . . only 7 have achieved [case clearance rates] at or above 100 percent.”). 
 54. In October 2008, Florida alone had a backlog of 338,000 civil cases. WASH. ECON. 
GRP., supra note 51, at 1. 
 55. See, e.g., Hunstein, supra note 31, at 5 (“Due to the speedy trial requirement in criminal 
cases, some judges have been forced to put civil cases on hold.”). Even with the constitutional 
protections of a speedy trial, criminal proceedings face long delays. Fulton County, Georgia, 
which contains most of Atlanta, had 183 murder cases waiting to be tried in early 2010, half of 
which were more than a year old. Id. After a reduction in weekend court hours, New York City 
faces the prospect of releasing people who are charged with crimes because the system cannot 
provide an arraignment hearing within twenty-four hours of arrest. Glaberson, supra note 36. 
 56. The Judicial System: The Feeblest Branch, supra note 50, at 31. 
 57. Dolan & Kim, supra note 44. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. As States Cut Court Budgets, Who Pays the Price? (NPR radio broadcast Oct. 4, 2011), 
available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=141043681. 
 61. Bill Rankin, Budget Cuts Take Toll on Georgia Courts, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Feb. 10, 
2011, at B2. 
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The state-court funding crisis is beginning to have deep impacts 
on the nation. Some of the effects are economic. For example, studies 
suggest that court delays could cost Florida’s economy $17.4 billion 
annually62 and eliminate up to 7000 high-wage jobs in Georgia.63 The 
more troubling effect of the funding crisis is the reduced access to 
justice and dispute resolution. Courts provide what the legislature and 
the executive cannot: protection from the political process. Courts 
protect rights that popular government may ignore.64 Commenting on 
the structure of the U.S. Constitution, Alexander Hamilton noted the 
tendency of the political branches to make rash decisions that bring 
“serious oppressions of the minor party in the community.”65 
According to Hamilton, courts are “requisite to guard the 
Constitution and the rights of individuals from the effects of those ill 
humors.”66 Thus, the barriers placed on court access by budget cuts 
are not simple inconveniences; they are threats to the liberty of 
American citizens. If the judiciary loses its ability to effectively 
defend rights, it cannot serve the protective function that the 
founders intended. Foreseeing the ease with which the other branches 
could undermine the judiciary, Hamilton warned that “all possible 
care is requisite to enable it to defend itself against their attacks.”67 
As Hamilton recognized, the American system of government 
depends on a judiciary strong enough to check the excesses of the 
other branches. Because state courts handle most litigation in the 
United States, the nation cannot respect this separation-of-powers 
principle without maintaining effective and independent state courts. 
Thus, the funding crisis described within this Part demands an 
 
 62. WASH. ECON. GRP., supra note 51, at 16. 
 63. WASH. ECON. GRP., supra note 49, at 1. 
 64. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 467 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) 
(“It is far more rational to suppose that the courts were designed to be an intermediate body 
between the people and the legislature in order, among other things, to keep the latter within 
the limits assigned to their authority.”). 
 65. Id. at 469. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 465–66. The discussion of the federal judiciary in Federalist No. 78 does not 
necessarily oblige states to create a similarly independent judiciary. At the time of the adoption 
of the U.S. Constitution, most state constitutions reflected the view that the legislature, as the 
representative of the people, should dominate the other branches of government. G. Alan Tarr, 
Interpreting the Separation of Powers in State Constitutions, 59 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 329, 
334 (2003). Throughout the nineteenth century, however, states found themselves suffering from 
legislative excess. Id. As of 1998, forty state constitutions explicitly stated a separation-of-
powers requirement, an expression of judicial independence not found in the U.S. Constitution. 
Id. at 337. 
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immediate and effective solution. As the remainder of this Note 
argues, the doctrine of inherent power provides a viable legal avenue 
for combatting the problem. 
II.  THE HISTORY AND COMPLICATIONS OF INHERENT JUDICIAL 
POWER 
Before proposing a new standard, this Note provides some 
background on the doctrine of inherent power. Inherent power began 
as a means of internal judicial housekeeping and grew into a method 
to secure discrete resources from local governments. In addition, a 
small number of courts have attempted to use the doctrine to make a 
wholesale challenge to the sufficiency of a state judicial budget. This 
latter broad use of inherent power exposed the problematic potential 
of employing inherent power in a state-level budget dispute—at least 
as the doctrine is currently formulated. Inherent power could too 
easily serve as a tool for the judiciary to usurp the legislative authority 
to appropriate state funds. Courts that assume legislative power 
threaten their own legitimacy by taking part of the budgeting process 
beyond public debate. 
A. Brief History of Inherent Judicial Power 
The first uses of inherent power had nothing to do with money. 
Early state constitutions, though establishing the judiciary as a third 
branch of government, did not fully define the scope of the courts’ 
power.68 In order to protect their ability to resolve disputes from the 
influence of the political branches, courts developed mechanisms to 
enforce judgments.69 These included the power to issue process, to 
control records of the court, to punish contempt, to ensure court 
decorum, to regulate the bar, and to control seized property.70 These 
powers are “inherent” because they derive not from express 
authority, but from the need for courts to maintain their integrity as 
adjudicators of disputes.71 Inherent power can be understood as an 
 
 68. Michael L. Buenger, Of Money and Judicial Independence: Can Inherent Powers 
Protect State Courts in Tough Fiscal Times?, 92 KY. L.J. 979, 1000–01 (2004). 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 1001–02 & nn.69–75 (providing case law citations for the listed examples). 
 71. G. Gregg Webb & Keith E. Whittington, Judicial Independence, the Power of the Purse, 
and Inherent Judicial Powers, 88 JUDICATURE 12, 14 (2004); see also Wayman v. Southard, 23 
U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 15 (1825) (“Every Court has, like every other public political body, the 
power necessary and proper to provide for the orderly conduct of its business.”). 
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“implicit necessary and proper clause,” which extends courts’ 
legitimate scope beyond what is specifically enumerated in 
constitutions and statutes.72 
From these efforts to regulate internal housekeeping, courts’ use 
of inherent power developed during the twentieth century into a 
doctrine robust enough to demand additional funds from the other 
branches of government. These demands, however, were typically 
modest and for specific expenditures that a court deemed necessary 
to conduct business.73 Some examples will illustrate. The 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, in O’Coin’s, Inc. v. Treasurer 
of Worcester,74 required a county treasurer to release $86 for a tape 
recorder and tapes, which a county court bought to record court 
proceedings when a stenographer was not available.75 In Grimsley v. 
Twiggs County76 the Supreme Court of Georgia held that a superior 
court judge could compel its county commissioners to pay for extra 
clerical help.77 The North Carolina Supreme Court, in In re Alamance 
County Court Facilities,78 even required a county to provide a new 
courthouse facility because the existing one was deemed “grossly 
inadequate, being in the large either obsolete, poorly designed, or 
nonexistent.”79 A common thread among these cases, and others like 
 
 72. Webb & Whittington, supra note 71, at 14 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 73. See id. (listing specific expenditures, including “temporary facilities for holding 
court . . . [,] the operation of a courthouse elevator, chairs and carpeting for a courtroom, and 
courthouse air conditioning”). 
 74. O’Coin’s, Inc. v. Treasurer of Worcester, 287 N.E.2d 608 (Mass. 1972). 
 75. Id. at 610–11. 
 76. Grimsley v. Twiggs Cnty., 292 S.E.2d 675 (Ga. 1982). 
 77. Id. at 678. 
 78. In re Alamance Cnty. Court Facilities, 405 S.E.2d 125 (N.C. 1991). 
 79. Id. at 127 (quoting the trial court’s order) (internal quotation marks omitted). Similarly, 
the Mississippi Supreme Court upheld an inherent-power order requiring a county to fix a 
longstanding noise problem in which trucks passing an adjacent highway drowned out 
courtroom testimony. Hosford v. State, 525 So. 2d 789, 795–96, 798 (Miss. 1988). 
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them,80 was a dispute between a city or county court and the local 
government body that funded it.81 
Nonetheless, state supreme courts have used these local disputes 
to craft a theoretically powerful doctrine of inherent power. These 
decisions extrapolate the power to compel funds from the basic 
structure of American constitutional government, namely the 
doctrine of separation of powers. O’Coin’s provides an example of 
such reasoning. In demanding payment for a tape recorder, the 
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held “that a judge may bind 
a county contractually for expenses reasonably necessary for the 
operation of his court.”82 The court grounded its explanation in the 
state constitution: “Under our Constitution, the courts of the 
Commonwealth constitute a separate and independent department of 
government entrusted with the exclusive power of interpreting the 
laws.”83 Judicial independence, as a part of the tripartite system, 
protects “every natural right of free men.”84 Judges cannot maintain 
their independence, however, if the system denies them the 
“authority to determine the basic needs of their courts as to 
equipment, facilities and supporting personnel.”85 That authority is 
essential “if the courts are to provide justice, and the people are to be 
secure in their rights.”86 The unwillingness of Worcester County to 
buy a tape recorder was, thus, an affront to judicial independence and 
 
 80. See, e.g., Smith v. Miller, 384 P.2d 738, 742 (Colo. 1963) (allowing a state district court 
to set the salaries of its staff against the objection of the county commission unless the 
compensation decisions were “wholly unreasonable, capricious and arbitrary”); Noble Cnty. 
Council v. State ex rel. Fifer, 125 N.E.2d 709, 717 (Ind. 1955) (upholding a county court’s power 
to hire and fix the salary of an employee, “[u]nless [it] has abused its discretion”); Vondy v. 
Comm’rs Court, 620 S.W.2d 104, 108 (Tex. 1981) (ordering a county to set a “reasonable salary” 
for a constable); State ex rel. Reynolds v. Cnty. Court, 105 N.W.2d 876, 885 (Wis. 1960) (finding 
that a county court “had the jurisdiction to institute on its own motion the proceedings to 
determine the question of the necessity for air conditioning,” valued at $250). 
 81. Webb & Whittington, supra note 71, at 15. 
 82. O’Coin’s, Inc. v. Treasurer of Worcester, 287 N.E.2d 608, 611 (Mass. 1972) (footnote 
omitted). 
 83. Id. Other courts have further grounded their separation-of-powers argument in the 
structure of the U.S. Constitution. See, e.g., Jorgensen v. Blagojevich, 811 N.E.2d 652, 660 (Ill. 
2004) (“Like the federal government on which it is modeled, the government of the State of 
Illinois is divided into three equal branches . . . . This provision embodies the doctrine of 
separation of powers which has been a hallmark of American government . . . .”). 
 84. O’Coin’s, 287 N.E.2d at 611. 
 85. Id. at 612. 
 86. Id. 
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a violation of the constitutional structure of government.87 O’Coin’s 
noted that its separation-of-powers reasoning is “recognized not only 
in Massachusetts but throughout the nation.”88 
Even though state supreme courts often cast the unwillingness of 
a local government to pay for a court expense as an insidious affront 
to judicial independence,89 courts have recognized that using inherent 
power comes with potential dangers—even in local disputes of 
relatively low magnitude. Courts are aware that the act of compelling 
funds is itself arguably a violation of the separation-of-powers 
doctrine; that is, a judicial tribunal is interfering with a legislative 
body’s authority to appropriate tax revenue.90 Responding to this 
concern, courts frequently insist that they are invoking inherent 
power with reluctance.91 Accordingly, the inherent-power doctrine 
has evolved to include a number of restraints on the power’s use. 
First, courts have limited the circumstances under which a court may 
compel funds.92 Most states demand that judges attempt and fail to 
procure funding through the normal channels before invoking 
inherent power.93 Some require that a judge seeking to compel funds 
receive prior approval from a court administrator or the state 
supreme court.94 Second, courts have established standards for 
evaluating inherent-power requests.95 The majority of states demand 
that compelled “expenditures are ‘reasonably necessary’ for the 
 
 87. See id. at 616 (“It is clear to us, however, that a county treasurer has no discretion in the 
payment of legally incurred obligations.”). 
 88. Id. at 612. 
 89. See Webb & Whittington, supra note 71, at 14 (“Such disputes have prompted state 
supreme courts to issue particularly high-flown paeans to judicial independence.”). 
 90. See, e.g., In re Salary of Juvenile Dir., 552 P.2d 163, 169 (Wash. 1976) (“[E]ven in 
enforcing the separation of powers, courts must intervene in the operation of other branches.”). 
For an extended discussion of this concern, see infra Part II.B. 
 91. See, e.g., Grimsley v. Twiggs Cnty., 292 S.E.2d 675, 677 (Ga. 1982) (“The inherent 
power of the court must be carefully preserved, but also cautiously used.”). 
 92. See Howard B. Glaser, Wachtler v. Cuomo: The Limits of Inherent Power, 14 PACE L. 
REV. 111, 118 (1994) (“[T]he courts placed a series of self-imposed limitations on the exercise of 
inherent powers.”); see also Jackson, supra note 17, at 227 (“Reviewing courts have imposed or 
identified several restraints on the inherent powers of courts. Included among these restraints 
are procedural protections for funding authorities who challenge judicial authority . . . .”). 
 93. Jackson, supra note 17, at 227–28; see also, e.g., State ex rel. Hillis v. Sullivan, 137 P. 
392, 395 (Mont. 1913) (“[W]hen . . . the established methods cannot or do not instantly meet, 
then and not until then does occasion arise for the exercise of the inherent power.”). 
 94. See Glaser, supra note 92, at 118; see also, e.g., MASS. SUP. JUD. CT. R. 1:05(1) 
(requiring written approval by an appropriate judicial officer). 
 95. Jackson, supra note 17, at 233. 
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effective (and perhaps efficient) administration of justice.”96 Others 
have erected higher bars to inherent power:97 “clear necessity,”98 a 
“compelling need essential to the orderly administration of the 
court,”99 and “absolute necessity.”100 
Once courts established the theoretical foundation for using 
inherent power to order relatively minor funding from local 
governments, using the doctrine more broadly proved irresistible.101 
Two events symbolized the transformation of inherent power into a 
doctrine powerful enough to impact statewide budgets. First, the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Commonwealth ex rel. Carroll v. 
Tate102 used the doctrine to contest the general sufficiency of a court-
system budget.103 Second, Sol Wachtler, chief judge of the New York 
Court of Appeals, made an unsuccessful attempt to force the state’s 
governor and legislature to increase spending on New York’s judicial 
branch.104 
Carroll involved a dispute over the budget for the Philadelphia 
Court of Common Pleas.105 In December 1969, the local court 
submitted a budget request to the city, which rejected the request and 
reduced the court’s appropriations.106 When the city council refused to 
modify its decision, the judges of the court sued the city.107 The 
 
 96. Id. 
 97. A few state supreme courts, however, have set the bar lower than reasonable necessity, 
permitting a court to act on its own initiative to spend funds. See, e.g., Smith v. Miller, 384 P.2d 
738, 742 (Colo. 1963) (allowing a court to set a salary schedule subject to reversal only when the 
County Board could establish that the schedule was “wholly unreasonable, capricious and 
arbitrary”). 
 98. Rose v. Palm Beach Cnty., 361 So. 2d 135, 138 (Fla. 1978). 
 99. Grimsley v. Twiggs Cnty., 292 S.E.2d 675, 677 (Ga. 1982). 
 100. Hosford v. State, 525 So. 2d 789, 798 (Miss. 1988). 
 101. Though merely compelling $86 from a county treasurer to purchase a tape recorder, 
O’Coin’s predicted broader use of inherent power, noting that “[n]othing stated herein should 
be taken to mean that the Commonwealth may not be bound in the same manner [as a county].” 
O’Coin’s, Inc. v. Treasurer of Worcester, 287 N.E.2d 608, 611 n.2 (Mass. 1972). 
 102. Commonwealth ex rel. Carroll v. Tate, 274 A.2d 193 (Pa. 1971). 
 103. See id. at 194–95 (recounting the petitioning court’s request for a budget increase). 
Though it represents an expansion of inherent power beyond the scope articulated in the cases 
discussed previously, Carroll actually predates many of them. 
 104. See Glaser, supra note 92, at 122 (“Prior to Wachtler v. Cuomo, there were no 
significant inherent power conflicts between coequal state branches of government.”). 
 105. Carroll, 274 A.2d at 194–95. The Court of Common Pleas is the trial-level county court 
for both civil and criminal cases. Common Pleas Court, UNIFIED JUDICIAL SYS. OF PA., 
http://www.pacourts.us/courts/courts-of-common-pleas (last visited Mar. 7, 2013). 
 106. Carroll, 274 A.2d at 194–95. 
 107. Id. at 195. 
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Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld a resulting order demanding an 
additional $2,458,000 for the budget of the Court of Common Pleas.108 
Though recognizing that governing requires the “harmonious 
cooperation between the three independent Branches,”109 the 
supreme court announced that when this cooperation breaks down, a 
court can compel “reasonable and necessary [additional funds] to 
carry out its mandated responsibilities.”110 The supreme court 
explicitly rejected the contention that the city’s failing finances should 
be factored into the reasonability of the local court budget, declaring 
that “the deplorable financial conditions in Philadelphia must yield to 
the Constitutional mandate that the Judiciary shall be free and 
independent and able to provide an efficient and effective system of 
Justice.”111 
The aggrieved court in Carroll presented a fundamentally 
different request than courts in other inherent-power cases.112 Those 
cases identified a particular resource that the court deemed 
indispensable to court business.113 By contrast, the Court of Common 
Pleas in Carroll determined that the city council’s appropriation of 
inadequate funds itself was sufficient to trigger inherent power.114 The 
only thing the court asked for was more money.115 Thus, the decision 
in Carroll represented a potential direct threat to legislative 
appropriation power. As some observers noted, the case prescribed a 
method by which courts could use inherent power to circumvent their 
funding authority’s budget process.116 
At the time of Carroll and in the years following, state courts 
underwent dramatic shifts in funding and organization, shifts that 
held great import for the use of inherent power. Until the 1940s state 
trial courts operated independently of each other and were primarily 
 
 108. Id. at 199–200. A state appellate judge, whom the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
specifically designated to hear the case, issued this order against the city. Id. at 195. 
 109. Id. at 197. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at 199. 
 112. See Glaser, supra note 92, at 116 (“[Carroll] marked an expansion of the inherent 
powers doctrine into broader fiscal matters than in previous cases.”). 
 113. See supra notes 73–80. 
 114. Carroll, 274 A.2d at 194. 
 115. Id. at 195. 
 116. See Glaser, supra note 92, at 117 & n.35 (citing commentators who made such an 
observation about Carroll). 
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funded by local governments.117 The state legislature held little 
influence over either lower courts’ budgets or their administration.118 
The second half of the twentieth century saw a move toward unified 
judicial systems.119 The particular ways that states unified their 
systems varied,120 but some trends emerged. First, unified systems 
tend to have a powerful state supreme court, which is given 
“significant rulemaking and superintending authority over the judicial 
branch.”121 Second, unified judicial systems often operate under a 
single budget approved by the legislature.122 The move to unitary 
systems made local inherent-power disputes less common, as courts 
now appealed to the state supreme court for funding rather than, for 
example, to a county commission.123 At the same time, unifying 
judicial systems pushed conflicts over sufficient judicial budgets from 
the local level to the state level, increasing the potential for an 
inherent-power showdown between a state supreme court and a state 
legislature.124 
Such a showdown occurred in New York in 1991. By then the 
state’s courts were operating under a unified system with a single 
budget.125 The chief judge of the New York Court of Appeals, Sol 
Wachtler, submitted a budget to Governor Mario Cuomo requesting 
an 8 percent increase in judicial spending over the previous year.126 
Cuomo, in the “largest package of spending cuts in New York State’s 
history,” responded by recommending that the legislature, instead, 
reduce the judicial budget by 2.8 percent.127 Wachtler did not react 
 
 117. See Buenger, supra note 68, at 1013 (“A state supreme court [was] generally the only 
court funded entirely from the state treasury . . . .”). 
 118. See id. at 1016 (“[S]tate legislatures paid little attention to the administrative structure 
of the courts or the associated costs of running them because very few courts were funded 
directly from the state treasury.”). 
 119. See Henry O. Lawson, State Court System Unification, 31 AM. U. L. REV. 273, 278 
(1982) (reporting that by 1979, twenty-two states had moved to centralized court funding and 
several others were considering doing so). 
 120. For a discussion of the complexities of court unification, see generally Victor E. Flango 
& David B. Rottman, Research Note, Measuring Trial Court Consolidation, 16 JUST. SYS. J., no. 
1, 1992, at 65; Lawson, supra note 119. 
 121. Buenger, supra note 68, at 1015 n.114. 
 122. Id. at 1017. 
 123. Glaser, supra note 92, at 121. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at 121 n.50. 
 126. Id. at 124. 
 127. Sam Howe Verhovek, Cuomo Proposing Steep Budget Cuts and Tax Increases, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 1, 1991, at A1. 
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well. In a public speech, he noted that other states had used inherent 
power to increase judicial budgets and added, “As far as I’m 
concerned, that’s an unconstitutional budget.”128 In September 1991, 
Chief Judge Wachtler filed a lawsuit against Cuomo, claiming that the 
governor, in coordination with the legislature, had not allocated 
adequate funds to the state judiciary.129 In addition, to demonstrate 
the financial condition of the courts, Wachtler fired five-hundred 
court workers.130 He also stepped boldly into a feud with Cuomo. The 
two jabbed at each other in the papers,131 and eventually Cuomo filed 
a countersuit to remove the dispute to federal court.132 
The conflict ended when Chief Judge Wachtler and Governor 
Cuomo settled the lawsuit days before the start of merit arguments.133 
The chief judge did not receive any of the additional court funding he 
declared constitutionally necessary; the governor merely pledged not 
to reduce the judicial budget below 1991 levels.134 The feud did 
manage, however, to demonstrate the potential messiness of a state-
level battle over the constitutionality of court funding. Both Chief 
Judge Wachtler and Governor Cuomo received scorn for their 
behavior during the dispute.135 In addition, Chief Judge Wachtler may 
have failed to convince the public of the merits of his inherent-power 
 
 128. Elizabeth Kolbert, Wachtler Says Cuomo Cut Judiciary Funds Unconstitutionally, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 11, 1991, at B5. The budget procedure in New York requires the governor to pass 
on the judiciary’s budget request to the legislature “without revision but with such 
recommendations as the governor may deem proper.” N.Y. CONST. art. VII, § 1. Cuomo did so, 
but in a separate “financial plan,” proposed a budget for the judicial system that was 10 percent 
lower than the judiciary’s request. Kolbert, supra. Wachtler argued that this maneuver was 
unconstitutional. Id. Notwithstanding this technical quarrel, the chief judge’s fundamental 
complaint was about the inadequacy of the judicial budget. See Glaser, supra note 92, at 127 
(“[T]he Chief Judge . . . suggest[ed] that the ‘enormity’ of the cuts would justify legal action.” 
(quoting Gary Spencer, Legislature Appropriates $899 Million for Judiciary, N.Y. L.J., June 4, 
1991, at 1)). 
 129. See Glaser, supra note 92, at 128 (describing the case). 
 130. Id. at 128. 
 131. See id. at 128–34 (recounting the public-relations battle between the two men). 
 132. Id. at 130. After initially filing his notice of removal in the Eastern District of New 
York, Governor Cuomo refiled his case in the Northern District of New York upon that court’s 
issuing “an order directing the parties to respond to its sua sponte consideration of jurisdiction.” 
Wachtler v. Cuomo, No. 91-CV-1235, 1991 WL 249892, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 1991). 
 133. Id. at 135. 
 134. Gary Spencer, Wachtler, Cuomo Settle Funding Suit, 207 N.Y. L.J., Jan. 17, 1992, at 1. 
 135. See, e.g., Kevin Sack, Cuomo Challenges His Chief Judge’s Lawsuit, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 
1991, at B1 (“Is it not time now . . . to withdraw from what will become a public spectacle with 
no benefit to the people whom both the talented Governor and the learned Chief Judge so 
desperately want to serve?” (quoting Judge Jack B. Weinstein of the Eastern District of New 
York) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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claim. An editorial in the New York Times commented that the chief 
judge had “escalate[d] an unseemly feud into a constitutional crisis” 
and declared the legal issues in the case “beside the point.”136 
B. Inherent Judicial Power’s Two Big Problems 
In the Wachtler/Cuomo dispute, the doctrine of inherent power 
proved a failure. One side made a political decision about the size of 
the judiciary budget. The other side made a legal judgment that the 
same budget was too meager. Both the governor and the court of 
appeals are the pinnacles of coequal branches of state government, so 
they found themselves at a constitutional stalemate. Neither legal 
precedent nor political tradition provided a resolution to their 
dilemma. The New York confrontation was not inherent power’s first 
big defeat, however. Despite a victory in Carroll—the case that 
defined the now-dominant reasonable necessity standard—the 
Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas never actually received any of 
the additional funding ordered by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.137 
Why has inherent judicial power proved unimpressive in state-
level disputes? Few would dispute that judiciaries, like other branches 
of government, have some level of authority to effectuate their 
constitutionally required functions.138 Yet in its most pressing hour—a 
budget dispute between two branches of state government—inherent 
power has fallen short of its promise. Rather than harness the sacred 
tenant of judicial independence to combat the folly of shortsighted 
legislatures, inherent power has exposed itself as no more than mere 
words. 
 
 136. Editorial, Wachtler v. Cuomo = Two Losers, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 1991, at A28. The 
chief judge held press conferences and released public statements to draw attention to his 
protest against the governor. Glaser, supra note 92, at 128–29; Verhovek, supra note 127. The 
failure of his inherent-power requests thus suggests that he was unable to sway public opinion in 
his direction. 
 137. In re Salary of Juvenile Dir., 552 P.2d 163, 174 n.6 (Wash. 1976) (“[T]he Philadelphia 
Court of Common Pleas has never received any of the $1,365,555 awarded by the court in 
Commonwealth ex rel. Carroll v. Tate . . . .”). In addition, the Juvenile Director court noted that 
the county involved in Judges for the Third Judicial Circuit v. Wayne County, 190 N.W.2d 228 
(Mich. 1971), had ignored the Michigan Supreme Court’s determination that circuit courts had 
the inherent power to require the county to compensate circuit court employees, Juvenile Dir., 
552 P.2d at 174 n.6. 
 138. See, e.g., Jackson, supra note 17, at 223 (“An overly expansive reading of constitutional 
texts is not required to suggest that the three branches of state government, in furtherance of 
their constitutionally mandated responsibilities, must have authority to . . . [do acts] beyond 
those explicitly stated in the constitutional texts.”). 
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In the decade after the Wachtler/Cuomo incident, commentators 
pondered inherent power’s insufficiencies.139 They found two major 
problems with the doctrine.140 One, by compelling funds, a supreme 
court threatens to usurp the appropriation power properly placed in 
the state legislature. Two, using a judicial order to requisition funds 
takes a portion of the state budget out of the political process. 
Circumventing the public will and the give-and-take of the state 
budget procedure threatens to undermine the legitimacy of the 
courts. Both of these problems result from the lack of judicial 
discipline provided by the dominant inherent-power standard, 
reasonable necessity. 
1. Inherent Power Encroaches on Legislative Appropriation 
Authority.  State supreme courts have argued that by failing to 
provide adequate appropriations to the judicial branch, legislatures 
have overstepped their constitutional bounds.141 Yet a court order 
demanding additional funding from a legislature also smacks of 
constitutional wayfaring. In the context of a state-level budget 
dispute, inherent power contains the potential to usurp the 
legislature’s power to spend state revenues as it finds appropriate.142 If 
uncabined, inherent power becomes, in effect, a secondary 
appropriations process. In its most abusive form, the doctrine 
provides a judicial veto over a portion of state budget. As Professor 
 
 139. Although this Note focuses on commentaries produced after the Wachtler/Cuomo 
dispute and the rise of the unified judicial branch, it is worth noting that earlier writers 
recognized the difficulties of using inherent power in a state-level dispute. Most notable is a 
1972 article by Professor Geoffrey Hazard and two law-student colleagues in which the authors 
wrote: 
A judicial requisition of funds . . . is in essence a judicial arrogation of discretion 
conferred, for better or worse, on the popularly-elected branches of government. 
Indeed, the virtue of [inherent power]—that it takes the problem of maintaining an 
adequate court system out of the realm of public debate and political commitment—
may also be viewed as an essential vice. No important function of government can be 
maintained over the long run without public debate . . . . 
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Martin B. McNamara & Irwin F. Sentilles, III, Court Finance and 
Unitary Budgeting, 81 YALE L.J. 1286, 1289–90 (1972) (footnote omitted). 
 140. At least one state supreme court has recognized these two problems as well. See 
Juvenile Dir., 552 P.2d at 169 (“[E]ven in enforcing the separation of powers, courts must 
intervene in the operation of other branches.”); id. at 173 (“By in effect initiating and trying its 
own lawsuits, the judiciary’s image of impartiality and the concomitant willingness of the public 
to accept its decisions as those of a fair and disinterested tribunal may be severely damaged.”). 
 141. See, e.g., Chiles v. Children A, B, C, D, E, & F, 589 So. 2d 260, 269 (Fla. 1991) (“[A]ny 
substantial reductions of the judicial budget can raise constitutional concerns of the highest 
order.”). 
 142. Glaser, supra note 92, at 137. 
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Jeffrey Jackson notes, courts are particularly inept at evaluating the 
appropriateness of appropriations.143 Inherent-power decisions often 
fail to consider the financial condition of the funding bodies from 
which they compel funds.144 Even when a court tries to do so, 
however, it may find itself “incapable of the task.”145 The judicial 
process does not seek the same ends as the political process. Courts 
articulate rules and limits, whereas legislative bodies balance and 
compromise. Defining a constitutionally demanded level of 
reasonably necessary funding is “antithetical to a political process in 
which priorities are negotiated rather than divined.”146 
By contrast, Howard Glaser describes inherent power as a 
species of checks and balances which is properly employed to 
preserve the independence of one branch of government from 
invasion by another.147 Inherent power can only be a defensive 
weapon. When the judiciary’s use of inherent power “diminishes the 
rights and powers of a coordinate and equal branch,” the power 
“ceases to act as a check on the other branches and begins to 
encroach on their dominion.”148 Decreasing the power of another 
branch is a line of demarcation over which inherent power cannot 
rightly cross, argues Glaser. When a state supreme court demands 
that the state fund the judiciary in excess of what the legislature has 
deemed adequate, the court has stolen the appropriation power of the 
legislature, “upsetting the fundamental alignment of the branches.”149 
For this reason, Glaser deems the use of inherent power in a state-
level budget dispute to be “untenable.”150 
2. Inherent Power Diminishes the Legitimacy of the Judiciary.  
Broad uses of inherent power may also imperil the judiciary’s public 
legitimacy. When a court demands additional funding from a 
legislature, it becomes an explicitly political actor. Budgeting state 
 
 143. Jackson, supra note 17, at 243. 
 144. Id. at 242. 
 145. Id. at 243. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Glaser, supra note 92, at 136–37. Howard Glaser was a Special Assistant to Governor 
Mario Cuomo during his administration. Id. at 111. He joined Governor Andrew Cuomo’s 
administration as an aide to the governor and New York’s Director of State Operations. Danny 
Hakim, Cuomo Fires Emergency Office Chief for Misusing Workers in Hurricane, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 8, 2012, at A15. 
 148. Glaser, supra note 92, at 137. 
 149. Id. at 138. 
 150. Id. at 113. 
YATES IN FR (DO NOT DELETE) 3/17/2013  7:37 PM 
1484 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 62:1463 
revenues is subject to popular pressure. By contrast, judicial 
decisionmaking is, at least in theory, insulated from politics.151 But 
when a court wades into a debate about state funding priorities, 
whatever supposedly disinterested decision it renders becomes a 
political issue.152 In addition, courts diminish their legitimacy by 
removing a portion of the state budget from public debate.153 The 
budget process gives the public, through its representatives, a voice in 
the distribution of public resources.154 Courts do not express the will 
of the people, at least in the direct manner that legislatures do. Thus, 
a court’s use of inherent power may frustrate public input into state 
spending, and the people may trust the courts less as a result.155 
3. The Cause of the Deficiencies: the Reasonable-Necessity 
Standard.  The two major problems created by the use of inherent 
power in a state-level budget dispute are, in large part, a result of the 
shortcomings of the reasonable-necessity standard. The standard does 
not provide a meaningful distinction between a court’s protection of 
the constitutional prerogatives of the judicial branch and a court’s 
substitution of its spending priorities for those of the legislature.156 
This standard can easily serve as a mechanism for a court to put 
constitutional imprimatur on a self-interested decision. Glaser uses 
New York as an illustrative example of this problem. He notes that in 
consolidated judicial systems with a central administration, state 
supreme courts oversee the court budget and, in some cases, make 
requests directly of the legislature.157 Thus, any level of funding that 
 
 151. See Sam J. Ervin, Jr., Separation of Powers: Judicial Independence, 35 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 108, 127 (1970) (“[The founding fathers] realized that individual liberty is 
best protected by an independent judiciary composed of judges who are subject to the 
Constitution alone.”). 
 152. As Professor Jackson notes, judicial independence, the supposed end of inherent 
power, “entails a judiciary free from popular attitudes.” Jackson, supra note 17, at 243. 
 153. See Buenger, supra note 68, at 1047 (“The judiciary must be cognizant of this 
uncomfortable fact [that it is a secondary player in the budget process] lest it risk misreading the 
public support so critical in legitimizing acts of government.”). 
 154. Michael Buenger calls this process a “constitutionally protected exercise in balancing 
competing public demands.” Id. at 1045. 
 155. Inherent power may also damage courts’ future prospects for additional funding by 
“reduc[ing] the likelihood of public debate on the issue of the adequacy of court funding.” 
Jackson, supra note 17, at 248. 
 156. See Glaser, supra note 92, at 139–40 (“The reasonable and necessary standard is thus 
no help as a device to screen out improper uses of inherent powers.”). 
 157. See id. at 121 (“[T]he introduction of lump-sum budget gave judges and court 
administrators greater flexibility . . . .”); id. at 122 (describing the process by which the New 
York chief judge makes a budget request of the governor). 
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the supreme court finds necessary for the judicial system is, by 
definition, reasonable; otherwise, the supreme court would not have 
requested it.158 Glaser concludes that, rather than providing a limit, a 
constitutional standard of reasonable necessity serves to make “every 
budget request [by a court system] into one which would provide 
grounds for an exercise of inherent power.”159 
The reasonable-necessity standard rests on the principle of 
judicial independence.160 Yet the standard, as it has been applied, 
reflects an inexact understanding of that concept. Courts demonstrate 
independence in two ways. First, judges decide cases free from the 
influence of the other branches of government, a quality one 
commentator has labeled “adjudicative independence.”161 
Adjudicative independence is an accepted foundation of American 
government.162 Uses of inherent power typical of earlier periods, such 
as those that regulated courtroom decorum and enforced judgments, 
fostered adjudicative independence to protect the right of judges to 
effectuate impartial, binding decisions. Even after the 
Wachtler/Cuomo dispute, inherent power in the service of 
adjudicative independence has maintained broad scholarly support.163 
Post-Carroll, however, courts have used inherent power to 
protect a broader kind of judicial independence—a “constitutional 
independence”164 that protects the entire judiciary from the influence 
of the political branches. As demonstrated by the cases discussed in 
the previous Section, courts have proffered the principle of 
constitutional independence to demand funds in support of smooth 
judicial-branch operations—first on a courtroom-by-courtroom basis 
 
 158. Id. at 140. 
 159. Id. 
 160. See supra notes 82–88 and accompanying text. 
 161. Buenger, supra note 68, at 1021. 
 162. Protecting the adjudicative independence of the judiciary is one of the purposes of the 
Good Behavior Clause of the U.S. Constitution. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 64, at 465. 
 163. See Buenger, supra note 68, at 1021 (“At the most basic and traditional level, courts in 
America possess adjudicative independence . . . .”); Glaser, supra note 92, at 150 (“[The 
doctrine of inherent power] serves as a useful tool for local courts to protect themselves from 
becoming overly subservient to local politicians.”); Webb & Whittington, supra note 71, at 45 
(“The inherent judicial power doctrine was developed to be a defensive weapon to protect 
judges from subversion or obstruction by other officials.”). 
 164. Buenger, supra note 68, at 1024; cf. Webb & Whittington, supra note 71, at 45 
(describing adjudicative independence as the whole of “judicial independence” and labeling 
constitutional independence “judicial effectiveness”). 
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and then on behalf of entire judicial systems.165 Given the checks-and-
balances system of American government, inherent power aimed at 
constitutional independence appears “harder to justify.”166 
Legislatures have a powerful check against courts; they set judicial-
system budgets. Courts’ uses of inherent power to increase 
constitutional independence—especially those that baldly demand 
more money—have the potential to diminish the legislature’s 
constitutional responsibility to guard the public purse.167 The 
reasonable-necessity standard does not provide a principled method 
for cordoning uses of inherent power that diminish the power of the 
legislature from those that threaten the state constitution.168 The 
standard too easily permits judges to style their political 
disagreements with the legislature as constitutional insufficiencies. 
If the reasonable-necessity standard cannot adequately guide 
courts in a state-level budget dispute, what remains of the doctrine of 
inherent judicial power? Commentators have offered various 
answers.169 At one extreme, Howard Glaser posits no scenario in 
which inherent power functions appropriately at the state level.170 
Gregg Webb and Professor Keith Whittington are equally pessimistic 
about the doctrine’s potential, allowing for its use only in the rare 
situation in which judges can no longer adjudicate free from political 
influence.171 Michael Buenger, former State Court Administrator for 
 
 165. See supra Part II.A. 
 166. See Webb & Whittington, supra note 71, at 45 (distinguishing attempts to influence 
judicial decisions from mere competition for scarce resources). 
 167. See Glaser, supra note 92, at 138 (noting that such use of inherent power “would 
redress the injury to the judiciary only by upsetting the fundamental alignment of the 
branches”). 
 168. Id. at 140; see also Webb & Whittington, supra note 71, at 45 (describing the Kansas 
chief justice’s plan to raise revenue independently of the legislature as “corrosive of the state’s 
vital constitutional balance”). 
 169. In addition to the authors discussed in this Section, Professor Orlando E. Delogu 
discusses the doctrine of comity as a means to resolve budget battles between state supreme 
courts and legislatures. See generally Orlando E. Delogu, Funding the Judicial Department at a 
Level the Supreme Judicial Court Deems “Essential to Its Existence and Functioning as a Court” 
Is Required by Doctrines of Comity and Duties Imposed by Maine’s Constitution, 62 ME. L. REV. 
453, 464–70 (2010). 
 170. See Glaser, supra note 92, at 150 (“[W]hen unitary financing and lump-sum budgeting 
replace a fragmented process of line-item appropriations, the doctrine of inherent powers 
outlives its usefulness.”). 
 171. See Webb & Whittington, supra note 71, at 45 (“The use of inherent judicial 
powers . . . may be most justified in [situations in which legislatures attempt to influence judicial 
decisions], which fortunately are rare. A less extreme, but more common, threat to judicial 
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the Supreme Court of Missouri, would limit inherent power to cases 
in which both the adjudicative and constitutional independence of the 
courts are threatened.172 He seems more inclined than Webb and 
Whittington to argue that such a case could arise in a fiscal and 
political climate in which legislatures are eager to cut court funding.173 
Unfortunately, all of these responses to inherent power’s 
limitations effectively remove the doctrine from the judiciary’s 
quiver. The conditions under which a state supreme court can wield 
inherent power acceptably, if they exist at all, would address only a 
narrow subset of insufficient judicial budgets, ones that interfere with 
judges’ ability to render an impartial judgment.  
The inherent judicial power to compel funds should have greater 
vitality. The doctrine is grounded in the separation of powers 
expressed in the state and federal constitutions.174 The limitations of 
inherent power, rather than demand that courts scrap the doctrine, 
suggest that inherent power requires further refinement to be 
relevant in a state-level dispute. The true difficulty of inherent-power 
controversies lies in determining the line between a level of judicial 
funding that violates constitutional demands and one that violates 
only the preferences of the state supreme court. The reasonable-
necessity standard proves little help in illuminating this distinction. 
Courts will naturally conflate their own preferences with 
constitutional reasonableness. Without a higher threshold than 
reasonable necessity, inherent power drifts into the realm of judicial 
legislation. But amending the inherent-power doctrine to minimize its 
 
independence arises from the competition for limited resources. . . . In such situations, the use of 
inherent judicial powers may be harder to justify.”). 
 172. See Buenger, supra note 68, at 1048 (“At the state level, the use of inherent power to 
compel funding would appear justified when a legislature’s exercise of its plenary authority over 
the budget interferes with the courts’ ability to exercise their adjudicatory function and 
undermines the judiciary’s constitutional status as an effective coequal institution of 
government.”). 
 173. Compare Buenger, supra note 68, at 1048 (“The exercise of inherent power in the 
context of defending the judiciary’s constitutional status promotes the principle of separation of 
powers and makes clear that in the United States, the judiciary is an active participant in 
governing the nation . . . .”), with Webb & Whittington, supra note 71, at 45 (“The rhetoric of 
judicial independence accompanying earlier uses of inherent judicial power harkened back to a 
pure theory of separation of powers, in which each branch was left free to exercise its own 
functions without encroachment from the others, but the judicial dependence on the legislature 
for its financing was a reflection of checks and balances that necessarily impinged on this 
separation of powers.”). 
 174. Cases on inherent power from across the nation agree that the structure of American 
tripartite government gives courts the power to compel funds. See Folsom v. Wynn, 631 So. 2d 
890, 899 (Ala. 1993) (per curiam) (providing a partial list of such cases). 
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harmful effects is possible. In the next Part, this Note will offer a 
recipe for doing so. 
III. A HIGHER STANDARD: ABSOLUTE NECESSITY TO PERFORM 
THE DUTIES REQUIRED BY FEDERAL AND STATE 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
This Part proposes a standard for using inherent power in state-
level budget disputes. The proposed standard is more stringent than 
the reasonable-necessity standard articulated in most jurisdictions. By 
adopting the new standard, state courts can reserve the use of 
inherent power for critical situations, thus limiting the potential for 
the doctrine to threaten judicial independence and the legislature’s 
appropriation power. 
Specifically, courts should adopt a standard of absolute necessity 
to perform the duties required by federal and state constitutional 
law—or constitutional absolute necessity, for short. At least one 
commentator has expressed his preference for an absolute-necessity 
standard, but he took his discussion no further.175 This Note will build 
on that suggestion and argue that an absolute-necessity test, 
combined with a requirement that courts identify a particular 
constitutional violation resulting from insufficient funding, addresses 
the problems of inherent power discussed in the last Part while 
preserving the power as a viable option for courts that are in financial 
peril. The proposed standard reserves inherent power for situations 
that truly threaten a judicial system’s ability to function. By limiting 
inherent power’s scope and grounding the doctrine in state 
constitutions, courts can avoid diminishing the legislature’s 
appropriation power and can preserve the judiciary’s public 
legitimacy.176 
This Note moves past the reasonable-necessity standard adopted 
by a majority of states, but it does not create its new, heightened 
standard from nothing. The standard of constitutional absolute 
necessity combines the concepts of two existing inherent-power cases, 
 
 175. Jackson, supra note 17, at 244. Professor Jackson suggests that an absolute-necessity 
standard would be “more manageable” because “a court could order funding only when 
necessary to preserve its existence.” Id. 
 176. Gregg Webb and Professor Keith Whittington offer a similar suggestion: “The 
requirement of a finding that the states have actually violated constitutional provisions for 
maintaining a functioning judicial system may also set a higher and more publicly sustainable 
threshold for judicial action than does the reasonable necessity standard . . . .” Webb & 
Whittington, supra note 71, at 45. But, like Professor Jackson, they say no more. 
YATES IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 3/17/2013  7:37 PM 
2013] INHERENT JUDICIAL POWER 1489 
Hosford and Wynn. These cases control in their respective states, but 
their perspectives on inherent power have spread no further. Both of 
these cases address the problem of judicial discretion by limiting the 
scope of the inherent-power doctrine—Hosford by adopting 
“absolute necessity”177 and Wynn by requiring a constitutional 
imperative.178 Though the guidelines of either case on their own are 
insufficient to address the current shortcomings of inherent power, 
mixing the principles of Hosford and Wynn provides a solid template 
for a new approach. 
A. The Foundations of the Standard: Hosford and Wynn 
Hosford involved a county courthouse situated along the main 
street of a Mississippi timber town.179 The courthouse contained 
neither air conditioning nor fans, so its windows remained open 
during court proceedings.180 The noise of passing trucks made witness 
testimony inaudible.181 The presiding judge stopped Billy Hosford’s 
trial twenty-five to thirty times in six or seven hours to allow traffic to 
subside.182 Hosford asked for a mistrial because of the distracting 
noise.183 The judge denied the motion,184 but during the hearing he 
noted that he had repeatedly asked county officials to fix the noise 
problem.185 He also discovered that one juror confessed to reading 
witness’s lips and another admitted that he missed portions of trial 
testimony.186 In open court, the judge implored the state supreme 
court to decide whether he could invoke inherent power to remedy 
the situation.187 
The Mississippi Supreme Court held that the trial judge in fact 
possessed the authority to invoke inherent power against his county.188 
But in doing so, the supreme court warned that the doctrine should 
not circumvent the budget process: “Of course, courts very largely are 
 
 177. Hosford v. State, 525 So. 2d 789, 798 (Miss. 1988). 
 178. Wynn, 631 So. 2d at 900. 
 179. Hosford, 525 So. 2d. at 795. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. at 794, 796. 
 182. Id. at 796. 
 183. Id. at 794. 
 184. Id. at 794–95. 
 185. Id. at 796. 
 186. Id. at 795. 
 187. Id. at 796. 
 188. Id. at 798. 
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supplicants of the Legislative branch. . . . And, it is not what judges 
individually or collectively think they should receive which controls, 
but what the Legislature in its wisdom decides.”189 The legislature’s 
discretion, however, “does not cover quite all the spectrum.”190 When 
“the Legislative branch fails in its constitutional mandate to furnish 
the absolute essentials required for the operation of an independent 
and effective court, then no court affected thereby should fail to 
act.”191 Though holding that the county had fallen short of its 
constitutional burden, the court reiterated its uneasiness with 
inherent power, calling its use “tortuous, distasteful, but at times 
absolutely necessary.”192 In particular, the court worried that using 
inherent power threatened the public’s perception of the judiciary’s 
impartiality. A court’s disinterest is “responsible for the respect and 
confidence which people have in their judges.”193 Facing the prospect 
of usurping legislative power and diminishing the public’s trust in the 
judiciary is “a situation no judge would wish upon himself,” so he 
must proceed “[c]autiously, yet firmly.”194 
Although Hosford expertly articulated the balance between 
legislative appropriation and inherent judicial power, the Mississippi 
Supreme Court addressed only a dispute between a local judge and a 
county commission. The case does not provide a general articulation 
of the conditions under which a state legislature “fails in its 
constitutional mandate to furnish the absolute essentials.”195 For that, 
this Note turns to Wynn, an Alabama case. 
Wynn involved a general challenge to Alabama’s judicial 
budget,196 so the case gave the court leeway to discuss the specifics of a 
constitutional floor to statewide judicial funding. In Wynn a circuit 
judge filed suit against Alabama’s governor, claiming that judicial-
branch funding reductions, as part of statewide pro rata budget cuts 
authorized by statute, were unconstitutional.197 The Alabama 
Supreme Court declared that the legislature, via statute, “cannot 
 
 189. Id. at 797. 
 190. Id. at 798. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. 
 195. Id. 
 196. Folsom v. Wynn, 631 So. 2d 890, 891–92 (Ala. 1993) (per curiam). 
 197. Id. The governor invoked ALA. CODE § 41-4-90, which permits across-the-board 
funding cuts to all state agencies to avoid deficit spending. 
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constitutionally . . . reduce appropriations to the Judicial Branch 
below that level necessary for the Judicial Branch to perform the 
duties required of it under Federal and State constitutional law.”198  
The Wynn court’s key innovation is the word “duties.” Unlike 
other inherent-power articulations, the one given in Wynn begins its 
inquiry in the provisions of the governing constitution, rather than in 
concepts more prone to judicial malleability, such as “administration 
of Justice”199 or “proper operation of the courts.”200 A court searching 
for a failed duty may not base its decision to compel funds solely on 
the abstract idea of constitutional independence.201 Concerns that 
legislative appropriations may threaten the coequal status of the 
judiciary cannot alone justify the use of inherent power against a 
legislature by a state supreme court. 
Requiring a litigating court to demonstrate an inability to 
perform a constitutionally mandated duty, however, is an exercise of 
another sort. The court must find a failure to perform a function that 
neither the legislature nor the courts themselves can abrogate. In 
other words, when the federal or state constitution imposes a 
particular duty, the courts have no choice but to perform that duty, 
and the legislature has no choice but to fund the courts sufficiently in 
their performance of that duty.202 The frustrations and political 
posturing of judges and courts become less important; instead, the 
inherent-power challenge focuses on the mandated performance of 
state government. Of course, even under a standard that looks for 
unmet constitutional responsibilities, courts must make 
 
 198. Id. at 895. In another articulation of this standard, the Wynn court wrote that the 
legislature could not reduce judicial appropriations “below what is adequate and reasonable for 
the judiciary to perform its constitutionally mandated duties.” Id. at 896. The “adequate and 
reasonable” language is pulled directly from the Alabama Constitution, which requires that 
“[a]dequate and reasonable appropriations shall be made by the legislature for the entire 
unified judicial system.” ALA. CONST. art. VI, § 149, as amended by ALA. CONST. amend. 328. 
Thus, Alabama, by constitutional provision, has established a lower constitutional barrier to the 
use of inherent power than this Note proposes. 
 199. See Commonwealth ex rel. Carroll v. Tate, 274 A.2d 193, 197 (Pa. 1971); see also 
Alamance Cnty. Court Facilities, 405 S.E.2d 125, 132 (N.C. 1991) (“[A] court may invoke its 
inherent power to do what is reasonably necessary for ‘the orderly and efficient exercise of the 
administration of justice.’” (quoting Beard v. N.C. State Bar, 357 S.E.2d 694, 696 (N.C. 1987))). 
 200. O’Coin’s, Inc. v. Treasurer of Worcester, 287 N.E.2d 608, 612 (Mass. 1972). 
 201. See supra text accompanying notes 164–168. 
 202. See Wynn, 631 So. 2d at 896 (“This principle, that constitutional directions, first from 
the United States Constitution and then from the Constitution of Alabama, take precedence 
over legislative proscriptions and affect how those proscriptions apply, is critical to the 
constitutional application of § 41–4–90.”). 
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uncomfortable evaluations of their own operational sufficiency and 
potentially divisive interpretations of governing documents.203 
Constitutional absolute necessity does not leave courts above claims 
of self-interest, as no inherent-power standard can. However, by 
moving the focus of inquiry from judges to constitutions, the 
proposed standard diminishes the possibility that a court will 
substitute its preferences for constitutional requirements. 
The greatest difficulty in adopting Wynn’s articulation of 
inherent power is determining the scope of constitutionally mandated 
duties. The Wynn court, though professing that its enumeration was 
not exhaustive, offered an extensive discussion of what the federal 
and Alabama constitutions require of the state judicial system.204 
Under the U.S. Constitution, courts must guarantee individual rights, 
such as freedom from “unreasonable search and seizure” based on 
“‘stale’ or untimely information, execution, or judicial review” and 
due process for “obtaining and confronting witnesses, rights against 
self-incrimination, and a speedy public trial before a jury.”205 As noted 
in Part I, however, ensuring these federal criminal protections has 
shifted the brunt of funding deficits to civil proceedings,206 about 
which the U.S. Constitution says little.207 Using the Alabama 
Constitution, however, Wynn went further. Under that document, 
residents have a “guaranteed right to a forum for the enforcement of 
his or her contracts,”208 “a right to prosecute a civil cause,”209 and “a 
right to a jury trial” in civil cases.210 Thus, appealing to its state 
constitution, Wynn contemplated a court’s use of inherent power to 
 
 203. See id. at 900 (“This Court recognizes, however, that . . . as a part of government, the 
Judiciary must cooperate in every way possible with the Legislature as it performs its difficult 
task of allocating limited resources.”). 
 204. Id. at 897. 
 205. Id. 
 206. See supra notes 55–61 and accompanying text. 
 207. See, e.g., Los Angeles Cnty. Bar Ass’n v. Eu, 979 F.2d 697, 706 (9th Cir. 1992) (finding 
“no basis in the Constitution for a rigid right to resolution of all civil claims within . . . a time 
frame”); see also David Hittner & Kathleen Weisz Osman, Federal Civil Trial Delays: A 
Constitutional Dilemma?, 31. S. TEX. L. REV. 341, 354 (1990) (“The difficulty that a court will 
face in determining at what point [civil] delays become unconstitutional . . . raises the concern 
that a court will consider the question nonjusticiable.”). 
 208. Id. at 898 (citing ALA. CONST. art. I, § 22). 
 209. Id. (citing ALA. CONST. art. I, § 10). 
 210. Id. (citing ALA. CONST. art. I, § 11). 
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guarantee the provision of the basic adjudicative services expected of 
the judicial system.211 
In addition to the explicitly enumerated requirements of the 
federal and Alabama Constitutions, Wynn reasoned that duties 
imposed on the courts by statute qualify as constitutional mandates.212 
The court cited examples of resource-consuming obligations imposed 
on the judicial branch by both Congress and the Alabama 
Legislature.213 Though Wynn did not spend space justifying its 
extension of required constitutional duties to include statutory 
obligations, the court was right to approve such an extension. Just as 
the legislature may use its appropriation power to craft the judicial 
budget, so too may the legislature use its plenary legislative power to 
demand particular behaviors of courts.214 Complying with directives of 
Congress and the state legislature is thus an expression of adherence 
to the constitutional structure of government.215 
Wynn added one further degree to the scope of required duties. 
The decision argued that if the federal and Alabama constitutions 
require the courts to perform certain functions, then those 
constitutions by extension must require the “allocation of sufficient 
resources for administration and complete delivery [of those 
services].”216 Specifically, this allocation includes the “costs of 
administrative support” and overhead expenditures such as “utility 
service, postage, publication expenses . . . [and] communications 
services.”217 The addition of associated administrative costs to the 
 
 211. Wynn used the Alabama Constitution and supporting case law to elaborate the scope of 
its constitutional mandate. Wynn, 631 So. 2d at 898. Wynn’s reasoning applies to other states, 
though the resulting set of required duties will differ depending on the requirements of those 
states’ constitutions. 
 212. Id. at 897–98 & n.4. 
 213. Federal law demands that state courts hold bond hearings within seventy-two hours for 
suspects arrested with a warrant and requires state courts to meet other federal requirements to 
maintain federal funding. Id. at 897 & n.4. State law requires courts, for example, to present 
juvenile court records before the tenth day of the month, file divorce reports with the state 
board of health within the first five days of the month, and transmit court records to appellate 
courts within specified time limits. Id. at 897. 
 214. See Buenger, supra note 68, at 1007 n.92 (“[T]he structure of state and federal courts 
remains a matter squarely within the purview of the legislature.”). 
 215. Upholding statutory mandates has become a point of increased concern. Even as they 
have reduced judicial budgets, state legislatures have required courts to perform an ever-
growing number of social-service functions. ABA TASKFORCE ON PRESERVATION OF THE 
JUSTICE SYS., supra note 8, at 2. 
 216. Wynn, 631 So. 2d at 897. 
 217. Id. at 896. 
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definition of mandated constitutional duties serves to broaden the 
effectiveness of Wynn’s inherent-power standard. Administrative 
costs are the battleground of the state-court budget crisis: rather than 
cease performance of a mandated judicial duty, judicial systems tend 
to reduce overhead costs, generally by decreasing their workforces.218 
At some level, these overhead reductions make provision of a 
constitutionally required service so cumbersome that its exercise is 
meaningless. An inherent-power standard that includes 
administrative costs greatly increases the ability of the doctrine to 
remedy a situation in which a court provides nominal, but inadequate, 
mandated services. 
B. Advantages of the Proposed Standard 
The inherent-power standard this Note proposes—absolute 
necessity to perform the duties required under federal and state 
constitutional law—provides several advantages over the current 
reasonable-necessity standard. The higher standard addresses the 
interbranch balance and public-legitimacy issues precipitated by the 
reasonable-necessity standard,219 but it leaves courts’ inherent power 
robust enough to prove a useful tool in state-level budget disputes. 
Importantly, constitutional absolute necessity addresses the 
shortcomings of inherent power discussed in Part II.B—its potential 
both to usurp the appropriation power of the legislature and to 
diminish the legitimacy of the judiciary. The standard does so 
primarily by reducing the potential pool of disputes for which 
inherent power can provide a solution. Any supreme court that 
compels funds from a legislature is subject to accusations of upsetting 
interbranch balance for its own self-interest, no matter what standard 
it employs.220 However, by refusing to consider inherent power an 
appropriate response to funding disagreements that do not meet the 
narrow criteria within the standard of constitutional absolute 
necessity, courts may speak with authority and legitimacy to those 
disagreements that do. First, by pointing to a constitutionally 
mandated duty that the judicial system absolutely cannot perform 
 
 218. See ABA TASKFORCE ON PRESERVATION OF THE JUSTICE SYS., supra note 8, at 2–3 
(describing how decreased judicial budgets have demanded immediate workforce reductions). 
 219. See supra notes 156–168 and accompanying text. 
 220. See, e.g., Hosford v. State, 525 So. 2d 789, 798 (Miss. 1988) (articulating an “absolute 
necessity” standard and warning that “the darkest cloud which can be cast upon a judge’s honor 
is suspicion that he has a personal interest in a case”). 
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without additional funding, a court’s use of inherent power will look 
less like a circumvention of the legislature’s appropriation power and 
more like a disinterested interpretation of the constitution. Second, 
because the use of inherent power would require the protection of a 
specific constitutional duty, the public is more likely to approve of its 
use. The American public broadly accepts the idea that constitutions 
form the foundation of our legal system.221 If a judicial system can 
justifiably argue that a legislative budget prevents it from providing a 
constitutionally required public service, the effort may very well win 
the support of the people. 
In addition, the proposed standard would limit the breadth of an 
inherent-power remedy. One of the strongest critiques of Carroll, the 
case that birthed the reasonable-necessity standard,222 was the extent 
to which the court significantly restructured Philadelphia’s judicial 
budget.223 Such heavy-handed remodeling of the city’s appropriations 
appeared to observers as an end-run around a disappointing 
budgeting outcome.224 Constitutional absolute necessity, by contrast, 
requires courts to identify specific unmet duties. As a consequence, a 
court adopting this standard may use its inherent power to remedy 
only specific constitutional violations that justify the use of inherent 
power. In other words, the court may ask the legislature only for 
additional resources sufficient to successfully perform the duties it 
deems unfulfilled—but no more. A supreme court’s interference with 
a legislature’s appropriation will remain discrete and limited. 
The standard of constitutional absolute necessity further 
improves current doctrine by implicitly demanding that judiciaries 
 
 221. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1787, 
1812 (2005) (“[I]t should suffice to say that the Constitution is the document and set of 
amendments thereto that are broadly accepted as the written expression of the foundational 
commitments of the United States as a political community . . . .”); Humphrey Taylor, What We 
Love and Hate About America, HARRIS INTERACTIVE (June 8, 2010), http://www.
harrisinteractive.com/vault/HI-Harris-Poll-Love-Hate-About-America-2010-06-08.pdf 
(reporting that 70 percent of 2503 Americans polled in May 2010 viewed the U.S. Constitution 
favorably). 
 222. See Commonwealth ex rel. Carroll v. Tate, 274 A.2d 193, 199 (Pa. 1971) (“[T]he burden 
is on the Court to establish that the money it requests is reasonably necessary for ‘the efficient 
administration of justice.’” (quoting Leahey v. Farrell, 66 A.2d 577, 580 (Pa. 1949))). 
 223. See, e.g., Glaser, supra note 92, at 116 (“[Carroll] marked an expansion of the inherent 
powers doctrine into broader fiscal matters than in previous cases. Substantial budget items for 
an entire municipal court system were in dispute . . . .”). 
 224. See id. at 117 (“In the wake of [Carroll], commentators predicted (with varying degrees 
of approval) that courts . . . had found a tool by which they could circumvent the budget 
process.”). 
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both prioritize constitutional responsibilities and use their resources 
efficiently before compelling funds through inherent power. Under 
the standard, a court hearing an inherent-power request in a state-
level budget dispute must decide when the meagerness of a general 
judicial budget renders a court incapable of rendering a specific 
constitutionally required duty. The inquiry requires finding some 
causation between the two. In states with consolidated court funding, 
the judiciary has the flexibility to allocate its resources among its 
different components.225 Courts should not use inherent power, under 
a rule of constitutional absolute necessity, to compel funding for 
programs to which they refuse to direct their already allocated 
money. Judicial systems must show that their total budget, utilized 
efficiently, leaves some constitutionally mandated duties unfeasible. 
This is a high bar, and an exact line between sufficient and insufficient 
funding will always be murky and fact-specific. But as state-court 
funding continues to decrease, and as judiciaries cut back more and 
more services, drawing a connection between unmet constitutional 
mandates and an insufficient general judicial budget may prove 
easier.226 
C. Responding to Possible Concerns with Constitutional Absolute 
Necessity 
Even if the legal standard constraining inherent power is raised 
from reasonable to absolute necessity, one might doubt the practical 
effect of the heightened standard. An objector might ask two related 
questions. First, does an absolute-necessity standard constrain judicial 
discretion any more than a reasonable-necessity standard? Judges 
who are willing to threaten the legitimacy of the courts to demand 
more funding from the legislature may be equally willing to invoke 
inherent power no matter the standard required. They are already 
convinced of the dire condition of the courts.227 Second, does 
requiring absolute necessity adequately distinguish scenarios that 
permit the use of inherent power from those that do not? Absolute 
necessity, like reasonable necessity, defies a clear definition. Judges, 
 
 225. Hazard et al., supra note 139, at 1293–94; see also ROBERT W. TOBIN, NAT’L CTR. FOR 
STATE COURTS, FUNDING THE STATE COURTS: ISSUES AND APPROACHES 60 tbl.4 (1996), 
available at http://cdm16501.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/financial/id/5 (describing the 
features of different types of centralized control of judicial budgets). 
 226. For an application of the proposed standard to a factual situation, see infra Part III.D. 
 227. See supra Part I. 
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who have a personal interest in the outcome of a court-funding 
dispute, are in a poor position to provide the substance of the terms. 
Both of these questions recall an objection shared by Howard 
Glaser and Professor Jackson: that regardless of the legal definition 
involved, courts may not determine the budget of the judiciary—a 
political task outside the legitimate scope and competency of courts.228 
Increasing the standard from reasonable to absolute necessity may 
raise the bar, but according to Glaser and Professor Jackson, the 
heightened language cannot justify what is essentially a self-interested 
and unprincipled distinction between necessary and unnecessary 
funding. Moreover, what constitutes absolute necessity could vary 
widely. For example, sitting supreme court judges may find two law 
clerks and a robust judicial administration office absolutely necessary 
to perform their constitutional duties.229 By contrast, a state legislator 
steadfastly committed to lowering taxes may contend that the 
judiciary can claim no absolute necessity for additional funding as 
long as the courts are functioning at some minimal level, even “if it 
means having trials outdoors under trees.”230 
Within some limits, these objections have merit. Absolute 
necessity, like reasonable necessity, allows too wide a domain for the 
subjectivity of judges. But this Note does not propose adoption of the 
absolute-necessity standard in isolation. Courts must also find that, 
without additional funds, the judicial system will fail to meet a 
constitutionally mandated duty. A court invoking inherent power 
under the constitutional absolute-necessity standard must point to a 
potential judicial deficiency and ground that deficiency in either the 
federal or state constitution. The proposed standard forces judges 
through the process of comparing the conditions of their judicial 
system with the particular requirements of their state constitution. 
The standard demands an objective inquiry. Moreover, even if judges 
issuing inherent-power orders under constitutional absolute necessity 
might have reached the same result under the reasonable-necessity 
standard, the new standard forces them to ground their decision in 
 
 228. See supra Part II.B.1. 
 229. Cf. Judges for the Third Judicial Circuit v. Wayne Cnty., 190 N.W.2d 228 (Mich. 1971). 
 230. Bob Johnson, Alabama Chief Justice Race: Moore, Graddick Challenge Malone, 
MONTGOMERY ADVERTISER, Mar. 11, 2012, at 5A. Roy Moore—who as of February 2013 
serves as the chief justice of the Alabama Supreme Court—was reported to have made this 
comment about the potential for a minimally functioning judicial system during a campaign 
event. Id. Although he is not a legislator, he made his comment while speaking to voters. This 
comment represents a potential perspective on court funding, albeit an extreme one. 
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constitutional law, not in their own judgment. By mixing an increased 
threshold of need with a focused constitutional inquiry, the new 
test—as a whole—limits judicial discretion. 
Still, even if the new standard proposed in this Note usefully 
narrows the field of factual situations sufficient to justify the use of 
inherent power against a legislature, state supreme courts will 
continue to face the possibility that legislatures will fail to comply 
with their funding orders. A dispute between a supreme court and a 
legislature is a fight between the highest body in two branches of state 
government. There is no other authority to mediate between the two 
parties.231 Though the supreme court has the authority to articulate 
the scope and meaning of state law, it is powerless to enforce its 
decision.232 Indeed, a legislature’s refusal to comply with an inherent-
power order is not without precedent. In In re Salary of Juvenile 
Director233 the Washington Supreme Court, though recognizing the 
doctrine of inherent power, refused to invoke the power against one 
of the state’s counties.234 The court remarked that “in circumstances 
where courts have been unable to build a convincing case, compliance 
with their financing orders has been problematic.”235 To support its 
proposition, the court noted that the Philadelphia Court of Common 
Pleas never received any of the money ordered in Carroll and that a 
Michigan county ignored its state’s supreme court’s demand for 
additional funds to hire law clerks and a judicial assistant.236 
Undoubtedly, a state supreme court that invokes inherent power 
runs the risk of screaming at an audience that refuses to listen. Our 
diffuse, tripartite system of government ensures that no standard of 
inherent judicial power can remove that possibility. And to be sure, 
courts must take care to avoid an unheeded inherent-power order. 
 
 231. Cf. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729 (1991) (“[T]his Court has no power to 
review a state law determination that is sufficient to support the judgment . . . .”); Murdock v. 
City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590, 626 (1875) (“The State courts are the appropriate 
tribunals, as this court has repeatedly held, for the decision of questions arising under their local 
law, whether statutory or otherwise.”). Under the proposed standard, a state supreme court 
could invoke inherent power to remedy a federal constitutional deficiency in the state judicial 
system. In this case, the U.S. Supreme Court might gain jurisdiction over an appeal. 
 232. See Jorgensen v. Blagojevich, 811 N.E.2d 652, 660 (Ill. 2004) (“[The judicial branch] has 
no treasury. It possesses no power to impose or collect taxes. It commands no militia.”). 
 233. In re Salary of Juvenile Dir., 552 P.2d 163 (Wash. 1976). 
 234. Id. at 175. 
 235. Id. at 174. 
 236. Id. at 174 n.6 (discussing Commonwealth ex rel. Carroll v. Tate, 274 A.2d 193 (Pa. 
1971); and Judges for the Third Judicial Circuit v. Wayne Cnty., 190 N.W.2d 228 (Mich. 1971)). 
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The judiciary depends on the strength of its words; an ignored court is 
a weak court. Adopting the standard of constitutional absolute 
necessity, however, lessens the chance that a legislature will turn a 
deaf ear. The proposed standard reserves the use of inherent power 
for absolutely necessary situations and demands that a court invoking 
the power justify its decision by pointing to an unmet constitutional 
duty. With these safeguards, an order from a state supreme court 
should possess the legitimacy necessary to prod the legislature to 
obey it.237 
D. Briefly Imagining the New Standard in Practice 
The standard proposed in this Part will limit the permissible 
scenarios under which state courts may invoke inherent power to 
compel funds to maintain their constitutional independence. This 
limitation serves to preserve the power’s legitimacy by rationing its 
use. But will a rationed form of inherent power adequately meet the 
challenges presented by the state-funding crisis? In other words, are 
cutbacks in court funding actually preventing state courts from 
performing any constitutionally required duties? If so, how might the 
new inherent-power standard remedy such a problem? 
Applying the standard of constitutional absolute necessity to the 
state-court funding crisis described in Part I will help answer these 
questions. In early 2011, the New York State Assembly passed a 
budget that reduced funding for the judiciary by $170 million.238 The 
New York State Bar conducted a study to determine the effects of the 
budget cuts across the state.239 The study found a general reduction in 
courthouse access, which resulted in delays and increased costs to 
litigants.240 One court service, however, found itself particularly 
devastated by the budget reductions: small-claims courts. In response 
 
 237. While Wynn was on appeal, the Alabama Legislature appropriated additional funds for 
the judicial branch, making the governor’s lack of consideration of its financial condition moot. 
Folsom v. Wynn, 631 So. 2d 890, 902 (Ala. 1993). If evidence existed to show that the lawsuit 
influenced the legislature’s decision to increase judicial funding, Wynn would stand as a model 
application of a court’s use of inherent power: a court declares funding insufficient, and in 
response the legislature, rather than the court, remedies the problem. 
 238. Act of Mar. 25, 2011, ch. 52, 2011 N.Y. Laws 107; N.Y. STATE, ENACTED BUDGET: 
FINANCIAL PLAN FOR FISCAL YEAR 2012, at 9. 
 239. N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N, REPORT OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE ON THE IMPACT OF 
RECENT BUDGET CUTS IN NEW YORK STATE COURT FUNDING 7 (2012), available at 
http://www.nysba.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Home&Template=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm
&ContentID=62096. 
 240. Id. at 9. 
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to the legislative cuts, the Eleventh Judicial District (Queens County) 
eliminated three quarters of its nighttime small-claims operations.241 
As a result, litigants wishing to pursue their claims on the night-court 
docket faced a six-month wait.242 
The standard this Note proposes—absolute necessity to perform 
the duties required by federal and state constitutional law—would 
allow a court to invoke inherent power to remedy this situation. 
Under the New York Constitution, the legislature has the power to 
“alter and regulate the jurisdiction and proceedings in law and in 
equity” of the judicial branch.243 The state assembly used this power 
when it defined the purpose and scope of New York City’s small-
claims court as part of the New York City Civil Court Act.244 
According to that statute, the procedures of small-claims courts “shall 
constitute a simple, informal and inexpensive procedure for the 
prompt determination of [small] claims.”245 Constitutional absolute 
necessity, as illuminated by Wynn, indicates that duties imposed on 
court systems by legislation stand in as constitutional mandates.246 The 
New York State Assembly created the small-claims court to provide a 
simple and prompt method of dispute resolution. Waiting six months 
for access to small-claims resolution is neither simple nor prompt. 
Thus, at least in this particular domain, the New York courts are 
unable to fulfill a constitutionally mandated duty. 
This example brings up a broader observation about the 
proposed standard. To justify a claim of inherent power under the 
proposed standard, any additional funding must be absolutely 
necessary. The operational condition of the New York judicial system 
strongly indicates that the Eleventh Judicial District cannot allocate 
any more resources to its small-claims courts. The system has already, 
among other measures, closed courthouse doors early,247 reduced 
experienced staff,248 limited library resources for pro se litigants,249 
 
 241. Id. app. at K2. 
 242. Id. Pro se litigants are often unable to miss work to attend court in the daytime. Id. In 
addition, the value of the disputes in small-claims courts will often make missing work 
economically prohibitive. 
 243. N.Y. CONST. art. 6, § 30. 
 244. N.Y. CITY CIV. CT. ACT § 1802 (McKinney 1989). 
 245. Id. 
 246. See supra notes 212–215 and accompanying text. 
 247. N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N, supra note 239, at 13; see also id. app. at K1 (describing the 
reduced hours in the Eleventh Judicial District). 
 248. Id. at 11. 
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eliminated pro bono coordinators,250 and reduced the size of jury 
pools to unsustainable levels.251 These measures make clear that the 
New York judiciary can find little space to create greater savings or 
efficiencies. To remedy its small-claims-court deficiency, therefore, it 
must have more money. 
Judiciaries have adapted to budget reductions primarily by 
reducing the availability of court services, not by eliminating those 
services altogether.252 In other words, state courts have worked 
diligently to respond to legislative budget cuts in ways that do not 
abrogate their constitutional duties. Constitutional absolute necessity, 
therefore, will perform its remedial task at the margins. States 
prioritize their court services. When the coffers are empty, judicial 
systems eliminate or reduce services at the bottom of the priority list. 
As judicial budgets continue to shrink, the cuts will, at some point, 
imperil services seen as imperative. In New York, judicial-budget cuts 
prevented access to small claims court. Inherent power should allow 
the New York judiciary to demand more money to fix that problem. 
As the funding crisis in New York festers and grows, the courts may 
be forced to eliminate additional constitutionally mandated services. 
When this happens, the standard of constitutional absolute necessity 
will provide further legal remedies. 
CONCLUSION 
Judicial resources have withered during the last two decades. 
Though courts make up only a small portion of most state budgets, in 
tough financial times courts have lost significant percentages of their 
funding. Legislatures often treat judicial systems as a politically 
costless harvest of budget cuts. As their funding decreases, however, 
courts struggle to provide the adjudicative services necessary for the 
smooth functioning of the nation’s legal system and economy. Many 
state judicial systems approach a point of fiscal crisis. Though not 
political actors, courts should not fail to respond adequately to this 
threat. 
 
 249. Id. at 14. 
 250. Id. at 15. 
 251. See id. at 16 (“[A]ttorneys’ challenges for cause are not receiving adequate 
consideration due to concerns that there are not enough potential jurors to allow for 
dismissals.”). 
 252. See supra notes 40–61 and accompanying text. 
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Invoking inherent judicial power to compel funds against a 
legislature can prove a viable tactic to combat inadequate judicial 
funding. But an inherent-power dispute between a state legislature 
and a state supreme court presents a quandary. What should happen 
when the branch of state government authorized to levy taxes and 
appropriate spending provides a coequal branch of government too 
little money to operate? On the one hand, the legislature is the voice 
of the people, and it has the right to allocate funding according to 
political will. On the other hand, the state supreme court is the voice 
of the state constitution, and even the legislature cannot stand above 
the state’s governing document. Though there is no clear path out of 
this dilemma, both branches involved in a funding dispute must 
respect the integrity of the other. For this reason, courts need the 
doctrine of inherent power. They must have a tool to voice their 
conclusion that the legislature has violated the state constitution by 
allocating too little money to the judiciary. But inherent power must 
remain cabined. Judges may not apply the doctrine simply to disagree 
with legislative budget choices. 
As this Note has argued, adding further protections to the 
currently articulated doctrine of inherent power strikes a balance 
between these two concerns. Under a standard of absolute necessity 
to perform the duties required by federal and state constitutional law, 
courts may use inherent power in limited circumstances and with 
particular restraints. Admittedly, the precise contours of the standard 
remain undefined. Each state must employ the standard in its own 
situation, given the particular mandates provided by its own 
constitutional law. But by adopting the standard of constitutional 
absolute necessity, a state judiciary may effectively challenge its 
legislature while continuing to respect its rightful authority. 
